Eighth Distinction

Division of the Text and Overview of Questions

1. “After the sacrament of baptism and of confirmation etc.” [Lombard ad loc.]

2. After the Master has dealt with baptism, whereby we are regenerated, and with confirmation, whereby we are strengthened, he here deals with the sacrament of the Eucharist, whereby we are nourished and made complete in what is good.

3. It is divided into two parts: in the first the Master makes connection with what has preceded and in it he makes determination about the Eucharist in comparison with the two prior sacraments. In the second he makes determination about the Eucharist in itself [n.6].

4. The first part is divided into two. In the first he sets down the connection of what needs to be said with what has been said. In the second part he gives the reason for the connection by comparing the Eucharist with baptism in particular.

5. And this part has two parts. In the first he compares the Eucharist with baptism in respect of excellence; in the second in respect of agreement and difference. Now the agreement is plain, that both sacraments are prefigured in the Mosaic Law, but the difference is that each has its own proper prefiguring. And he sets down the agreement and difference as follows: first he sets down the prefiguring proper to each sacrament in the Mosaic Law, and second he sets down the prefiguring proper to each in their cause.

6. And next follows the part where the Master deals with the Eucharist in itself.

7. And this part has four parts. First the Master deals with the sacrament of the Eucharist and of the taking of the sacrament; second with the conversion or consecration, whereby the sacrament begins to be; third with the accidents remaining after the consecration; fourth with the minister of the sacrament. The second part starts at the beginning of distinction 11; the third at the beginning of distinction 12; the fourth at the beginning of distinction 13.

8. Now the first part is divided into two, for the Master first determines the truth about the sacrament and the receiving of it; secondly he excludes errors opposing it.

9. The first part again is divided into two, for he first determines the truth of the sacrament, and second the receiving of it (at the beginning of distinction 9)

10. The first of these parts is divided into preface and treatise (whicha begins at “The Lord instituted the sacrament”).

a.a [Interpolation]: and therefore I do not divide the preface from the whole treatment of the Eucharist, but only from the treatment contained in this distinction, for there are only four things proposed here that the treatment determines. The treatment is in this way_

11. And the treatment has two parts. In the first he deals with two matters he has set down, namely the institution and the form of this sacrament. In the second he deals with two others, namely the sacrament and the thing.

12. The first part is again divided into two. First he deals with the truth of the institution, and second he excludes an error or doubt about it.

13. The first again is divided into two. First he deals with the institution and second with the form.

14. As to this eighth distinction there are three questions principally to be dealt with: first the sacrament, whether the Eucharist is a sacrament of the New Law; second the form, whether it is the form set down in the canon of the mass; third the institution, whether this sacrament was suitably instituted after the Last Supper (the Cena).

Question One. Whether the Eucharist is a Sacrament of the New Law

15. Proceeding thus to the first question, argument is made that the Eucharist is not a sacrament of the New Law.

First because a sacrament of the New Law is a sign of the grace conferred in it [Ord. IV d.1 nn.194-195]; but the Eucharist is not a sign of this sort, because it remains on the altar after consecration and no grace is given by it to anyone.

16. Again, “the sacraments of the New Law effect what they signify” [ibid. d.1 n.276]. The Eucharist is not of this sort, because it figures or signifies that the true body and blood of Christ are contained under the very species [of bread and wine]; but those species do not effect this, for no finite virtue can have causality with respect to it.

17. Again, the sacraments of the New Law contain some definite words that are the form of the sacrament [ibid. d.3 nn.41-47]. The Eucharist does not, because the words that are the form of the sacrament must be simultaneous with the sacrament; but they are not simultaneous with the sacrament, first because the Eucharist remains when the words do not, and second because, while the words are being pronounced, the Eucharist does not exist but only at the end of the pronouncing.

18. Again in the Metaphysics 4.4.1006b7 it is said, “What does not signify one thing does not signify.” The Eucharist is not one sacrament or sign, nor does it signify one signified thing. The proof of the minor is that the species of bread is one sign and the species of wine is another sign, and they signify their own different thing, because the body of Christ is what one of them signifies and the blood of Christ what the other signifies.

19. On the contrary:

In Gratian, Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.1, the words “Nothing else must be offered in the sacrament besides wine and water...” are speaking of the Eucharist. And in the same place is said, “In the sacrament of the body and blood nothing else is offered save what the Lord himself handed down.”

I. To the Question

20. Here three things must be looked at. First, following the procedure in the other sacraments [Ord. IV ‘Epilogue of the distinctions about baptism’ n.1; d.7 n.7], some notion of the name ‘eucharist’ must be set down, and it must be taken from the usage of speakers; second, inquiry must be made whether anything real subsists under that notion; third, whether that which so subsists is a sacrament of the New Law, which is the principal question.

A. About the Idea or Definition of the Eucharist

21. The idea of the name ‘Eucharist’, according to those who commonly use or speak about the Eucharist, can be as follows: ‘The Eucharist is, by divine institution, a perceptible sign truly containing, after the proper matter has been rightly consecrated, the body and blood of Christ’.a

a.a [Text canceled by Scotus] The Eucharist is the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, which are truly contained under the species of bread and wine after consecration by a priest in definite words pronounced with the proper intention, truly signifying, by divine institution, that the body and blood of Christ are really contained under those species.

B. Whether Anything Real subsists under Such an Idea

22. About the second point [n.20], I say that this idea is not false in itself, because no part is repugnant to another.

23. For it is possible, without contradiction, for the body of Christ to be contained under the species of bread and his blood under the species of wine (which is something presumed here, because it will be made clear in d.10 nn.24-70). And it is possible that these signs were instituted by God to signify in truth that the things signified are contained under the species, for what God can do he can signify through some perceptible sign imposed to signify it. Therefore, some being, that is, something to which existence is not repugnant, does subsist under this idea.

24. Further, I say that there subsists under it some being effectively, for the fact can be proved by authority and fitting reason.

25. The authority is Matthew 26.26-29 where, after the Cena Christ instituted this sacrament, so that under the species his true body and true blood were truly contained. And not only then when he himself confected it, but also when the sacrament was confected by priests in the Church, since he adds for the Apostles there, “This do in commemoration of me.”

26. The same is contained in Luke 22.19-20 and I Corinthians 11.23-29; 10.16-17, where the Apostle gives full determination about the manner of receiving and consecrating this sacrament. “This bread,” he says, “which we (we priests) break, is it not a participation in the body of the Lord?” And that this sacrament was to continue perpetually in the Church he there says, “As often as you eat this bread and drink this cup you proclaim the death of the Lord until he come (understand: for judgement).” Hence the Church militant is going to last until then and the Eucharist in it, as all the saints maintain.

27. But the proof that the sacrament is fitting is that it is fitting for Christ to be with us in such a perceptible sign, so that each may be the more stirred to devotion and reverence for Christ. And this is plain in fact, because almost every devotion in the Church is ordered to this sacrament, for a cleric performs his divine office for this reason with greater care in its ordering to the mass. Also, for this reason do the people more devoutly attend to mass than any other ecclesiastical duty. Again, for this reason individuals confess with greater care when they intend (according to the ordering of the Church) to receive communion, which should at least be done once in a year, according to the ordering of the Church.

28. It was also fitting that after spiritual generation spiritual nourishment is conferred on us, and this is more fittingly given to us under the likeness of bodily nourishment; now the chief bodily and spiritual nourishment consists in bread and wine;   therefore etc     

29. It was fitting too that the perceptible sign, under which God wished to give himself to us and to be with us, should have an order to certain words spoken by some minister, because otherwise we would not know when Christ was in such sign and when not, and thus due reverence and devotion would perish.

30. It was also fitting that in the pronouncing of the words the minister should stand out in the Church, that is, be a priest, through whose ministerial act Christ would thus begin to be with us.

C. That what Subsists under the Idea of this Name is a Sacrament

31. About the third point [n.20] I say that in the idea of the name set down above [n.21] a sacrament is included, because it is, by divine institution, a truly representative sign. And although it does not represent accidental grace, yet it does represent some gratuitous gift of God, namely the being of the body of Christ in the species. Now the grace in the definition of the sacrament is not taken just for an accidental grace but for a gratuitous effect of God [n.39, Ord. IV d.1 n.207].

32. About the unity of this sacrament I say that it would be very possible for several perceptible things to come together in the foundation of a single sacrament (as was said above about the cleansing and the words in the foundation of the relation of baptism [d.3 nn.41-47]), though one of them would not then be part of the sacrament without another. But here the species of bread contains what it signifies under the species of wine, and conversely.

33. Therefore I say that the body of Christ can be taken strictly, as it contains only the parts animated by the soul of Christ, and blood is not of this sort (though it is in proximate potency for conversion into animated flesh). And thus the body is essentially different in itself and from the blood, and it can also be a different signified thing; and consequently it can be the proper sign as also the proper definition of it.

34. In another way the body can be taken for all the things it includes that belong to the whole organic body, whether they be parts formally animated or some of them not formally animated (as fluids and spirits); and in this way blood is a part of the body.

35. Taking the body in the first way, although it and blood are primarily different signified things, yet they constitute one whole signified thing, which is the body taken in the second way. And so the proper sign of the body taken in the first way and the proper sign of the blood can be a single sign with singleness of integrity but not of indivisibility.

36. Now it is fitting that this sacrament has such unity of integrity and not of indivisibility, because it is for the complete nourishment of the soul. But complete nourishment of the body comes from nourishment that is one with oneness of integrity, not unity of indivisibility; for food does not nourish sufficiently without drink nor drink without food.

37. From what has been said there is plain a fourfold difference and excellence of this sacrament in respect of others, wherein there is a triple difference and excellence in signifying.

A first is that this sacrament is most true in signifying. For the other sacraments are true as far as concerns themselves, but they sometimes do not have their signified effect because of the indisposition of the receiver; but this sacrament never lacks what it signifies.

38. The second excellence of this sacrament is that what it signifies it really contains, but not the other sacraments.

39. The third excellence is of what is signified by it. For the other sacraments signify an accidental grace inhering in the recipient, while this sacrament signifies subsistent grace, namely the true body of Christ existing in it.

40. The final and fourth difference is in the manner of being of this sacrament, because all the other sacraments consist in use and in becoming, so that the sacrament there and the reception of it are the same (as baptism and its reception); nor does anything that is the sacrament remain when the use and reception cease. But this sacrament is something that persists even before use.

41. And this was fitting, because Christ wished permanently to be with us, and so to be in some permanent sign, which sort of sign this sacrament is. Hence here the use is not the sacrament; for the using of the sacramental words is a sort of way to the sacrament, because the sacrament begins to be at the end of the speaking of the words; while the use or reception of this sacrament is a sort of ceasing to be of the sacrament, or the way in which this sacrament is applied to a member of the Church. And it is very possible that in both uses, if done worthily, grace is conferred on the user.

42. But these are not the formal and first thing signified by the Eucharist but they are sorts of sacramental act, in which grace can well be received if they are done worthily - though more in reception than in consecration, because the act of reception signifies spiritual nourishment, which is by the conferring of grace.

II. To the Initial Arguments

43. From the above the answers to the arguments are plain.

As to the first [n.15], because the Eucharist is not a sign of accidental grace but of subsistent grace.

44. As to the second [n.16], it seems the difficulty is good against someone who posits that the sacrament has an action with respect to the thing signified [IV d.1 nn.279-283], but it is not valid against me. For I say that the proposition “a sacrament effects what it signifies” is understood in this way, namely that if it signifies the coming to be of something then that something comes to be through the sacrament through an efficacious sign; but if it signifies the being of something, then that something exists through the sacrament through a true sign [ibid. nn.192-193, 308, 315, 323]. How the ‘through’ is to be understood was stated in d.1 n.280.

45. And when it is said there [n.16] that no finite power can act to make the body of Christ present, I concede when speaking properly of action. Yet some finite virtue or some part of finite virtue can be an immediate disposition for the being of Christ’s body there, not by itself but by God co-assisting there. And in this way did God institute the species, so that, after the consecration, he assists them for the containing of the real presence of Christ’s body.

46. As to the third [n.17] it is plain that the sacrament does not have words for form, because then it would not be a sacrament that remains, since words cannot exist except in succession. But the consecration of the sacrament consists in coming to be, and it requires some form of words in it; but they are not the form of the sacrament but the form of the consecration of the sacrament. And to this extent they can be called sacramental words, because they belong to the sacrament as the form of its consecration, and this consecration is the sacramental beginning. But these words are not said thus to be sacramental as the words of baptism are; for the latter sacramental words are the form of the sacrament.

47. But if you are altogether asking what the form of this sacrament is, I say that the perceptible species are the form, that is, the proximate and formal foundation of the signification, and the signification is what is formal there, as it is in other sacraments.

48. And if you ask what in this foundation is as the matter and what else as the form, I reply that there is not one thing as matter and another as form in it as in the other sacraments. The reason is that this sacrament is permanent and so no words can pertain to its essence. But in any sacrament matter and form are distinguished - the visible sign is said to be the matter, and the words the form.

49. To the fourth [n.18] the reply is that they are both a single sign of one thing (as the body of Christ).

50. On the contrary: synonymous names are different names despite signifying the same thing - and this for the reason that there are several spoken words imposed there for doing the signifying; therefore, by similarity, just as here there are different species doing the signifying, there will be a different sacrament.

51. Therefore I say in another way that, as was said at the end of the question [n.36], the sacrament is one by oneness of integrity, not indivisibility. Therefore, the argument [n.50] does not work.

Question Two. Whether the Form of the Eucharist is what is set down in the Canon of the Mass

52. To proceed to the second question [n.14], argument is made that what is set down in the canon of the mass is not the precise consecration of the Eucharist.

53. First, because the pronoun ‘this’ points either to the substance of the bread or to its accidents, and in both ways the proposition is false. Either it points to the body of Christ and then the proposition does nothing, as does neither the proposition ‘my body is my body’; for no proposition does anything or works anything that would be true whether any action or operation is not posited or equally whether one is posited, of which sort is ‘my body is my body’. Again, the pronoun ‘this’ is demonstrative for the moment for which it is spoken; but in that moment the body of Christ is not there; so in that case it is demonstrative of the bread or the accidents. But then the proposition is false, because neither the bread nor the accidents are the body of Christ. But false speech cannot be the form in a sacrament of truth;     therefore etc     .

54. Again, it is not licit to interpose anything as a matter of rule in the form of the sacrament handed on by Christ (by ‘as a matter of rule’ I mean a slight casual interruption, as was spoken about in the definition of baptism [IV d.3 nn.77-78]); but the conjunction ‘for’ is here interposed as a matter of rule, and it is not handed on by Christ, as is plain from the Gospels.

55. Again, just as the pronoun ‘I’ signifies the first person, so the pronoun ‘my’ signifies the possessive of the first person. Therefore just as someone who says ‘I’ is speaking of himself, so someone who says ‘my’ is pointing to something he possesses; therefore when the priest says ‘my’ he is pointing to the thing’s being his own, that is, the priest’s.

56. Again, about the form of consecration of the blood, argument is made that it is not the form we use, because it is not found handed on by Christ - for no Evangelists sets down those words.

57. Again, as few words seem to sufficient for the consecration of the blood as for that of the bread;     therefore , since the consecration of the body consists of four words, it seems it should be similar also for the consecration of the blood, that is, that the following words should suffice, namely ‘this is my blood’; therefore the rest are superfluous.

58. On the contrary:

In Gregory IX, Decretals, Innocent III says that the form of the words, as it is written in the Canon, was received from Christ by the Apostles and from the Apostles by their successors; therefore etc     .

I. To the Question

59. My reply.

Here three things must be looked at: first whether the Eucharist has a single form; second which form; third what it signifies.

A. Whether the Eucharist has a Single Form

60. The first point is plain from the solution to the preceding question [nn.35-36], because no words are the form of the Eucharist nor belong to its essence, but some words are the form of the consecration of the Eucharist.

61. And by understanding the form in this way (because it is thus put in the question what the form of consecration is), I say that just as this sacrament is one by oneness of integrity and not indivisibility [ibid.] (for it includes in itself two partial signs, which each first signify their own two proper and proximate things, namely body and blood, and two remote things, namely spiritual eating and drinking), so too is this sacrament one consecration by oneness of integrity and yet two partial consecrations. For just as some things are one, so is their beginning one, and just as some things are several, so are their beginnings several; and just as the consecration is several, so is its beginning several. The consecration, therefore, is several partial consecrations, yet one consecration by oneness of integrity

62. Now the distinction between these partial forms is clear, because each of them is efficacious without the other. The fact is manifest; for otherwise the faithful, when adoring the body of Christ before the consecration of the blood, would be idolaters (which is false).

B. What the Form of the Eucharist is

1. About the Words for the Consecration of the Body

63. About the second point [n.59] I say the words of consecration of the body of Christ are four: the pronoun ‘this’, the verb ‘is’ and, as the predicate in apposition, ‘my body’.

64. “The conjunction ‘for’ is not of the essence of the form,” according to one doctor [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.8 3 q.1], “but is put to designate the ordering of the consecration of the sacrament to the use of the sacrament.” This is plain from the words, “Take, this is my body etc.”, as if one were to say, “Since the consecration is of this sort, use thus the thing consecrated.”

65. But another reason can be given, namely that the ‘for’ is put to show that the words that belong to the form are not spoken without what precedes.

66. But there is here a doubt, whether the priest would complete the sacrament by means of these four words [n.63] when omitting the preceding words.

67. One statement [Richard of Middleton] is that he would, because the four words are the form and the others are for reverence or for preceding with a prayer.

68. But one can, against this, argue that the sacramental words, by the force of the words, should signify what is done there by the force of the sacrament; but the existence of the true body of Christ is effected there by the force of this kind of consecration; therefore the words should adequately signify this by their own force, namely that the body of Christ is contained there. But the words “This is my body,” when spoken without the preceding ones do not signify this absolutely, because the ‘my’ signifies that it refers to the person of the speaker, for although the minister could be intending to speak in the person of Christ, yet the thing signified by the words would, for this reason, not be that the word ‘my’ would denote the body of Christ but that it would denote the body of the speaker. It would be just as if I were to begin speaking thus: “my doctrine is not mine;” for although I would be intending to speak in the person of Christ, yet one would not get from the force of the words that this is the doctrine of Christ, but rather that it is the doctrine of him who is speaking. It is like when the angel said in the person of God, “I am the God of Abraham” [Exodus 3.2-6]; the proposition was not false in the sense in which it was spoken, yet the proper significance of this sentence is that the ‘I’ would be standing for the person of God.

69. This is also confirmed by the words of Ambrose (On the Sacraments IV ch.4 n.17, ch.5 n.21 [Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.55]), “The words of Christ alter the creature,” and there follows, “With what words is the consecration done? Hear what the words are: ‘Take and eat all of you of this, for this is my body’,” where Ambrose seems to conjoin the preceding words, namely ‘Take.’, as if they were words of consecration. But this is not to be understood as if they essentially pertained to the necessity of the consecration, but as if they were necessarily to be placed first; and not only these words but several others that precede in the canon. And therefrom can be got that, by the force of the words, ‘this is my body’ are said in the person of Christ.

70. Hence not without cause did the Church thus connect the whole canon of the mass, because from the place “Having communion with.” up to the place “Humbly we pray thee, almighty God.” there is no section that is not connected with the preceding, either by a copulative conjunction (as “We therefore beseech thee.this oblation” and the like), or by an indefinite pronoun (as is plain from the words “Which oblation do thou, O God.,” and “Who the day before he suffered...” and, after the consecration, “Deign to regard them.”) or by relation (as “In like manner.”).

71. There will, as to this article, be a general discussion about what things will have to be observed, together with other doubts. [nn.89-91].

2. About the Words of Consecration of the Blood

a. Two Doubts and their Solution

72. About the words of consecration of the blood there is more doubt, because there are two things for doubt:

The first is that none of the Evangelists recites the form that we use;     therefore , based on the Gospel, the form does not seem certain. The Greeks too use another form saying, “This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins etc     .;” and consequently our form is not exact.

73. I reply that I do not doubt but that our form is certain, according to the authority of Innocent [n.58], because many things have been handed on to the Church by the Apostles that, however, are not thus written in the Gospels.

74. Nor is what is said about the Gospels a problem, because the Evangelists intended to narrate what was done, and not to hand on the form of consecrating.

75. But even about the form of the Greeks the Church does not say that they do not perform the sacrament.

76. Hence some say that their form and ours (and whatever is written in the Gospels) is sufficient for consecration, but in the Roman Church the form that we use is a necessity for the minister.

77. The second doubt is whether to the form we use belong all the words from the place “In like manner.” up to “Wherefore, Lord, we.mindful.”

78. But it is commonly held that the words “Do this in memory of me” do not belong to the form.

79. The proof is shown in this way, that “Take.this [in memory of me]” does not more relate to the blood than the body, for Christ commanded that the consecration of the body as of the blood be done in memory of him; therefore if these words belong to the consecration of the blood, by equal reason they belong to that of the body as well, and consequently, when the host is elevated, the body of Christ has still not been consecrated and so it is idolatry (which is not to be said).

80. The point is also plain because the precept about the use of consecration is not the form of the consecration; but this precept, when “Do this in memory of me” is said, is about the use of the consecration, as the words show;     therefore etc     .

81. Again, by these words Christ conferred on the Apostles the power of performing the sacrament; for he ordained them priests; but the conferring of power to consecrate is not done by words pertaining to consecration, because the words of consecration have regard to the matter that is consecrated, or to the term for which it is consecrated; but the words conferring power have regard to the power they confer and to him on whom it is conferred.

b. Whether all the Words belong to the Form of Consecration of the Blood

82. On the supposition that the above is certain, do all the words (up to “Do this...”) belong to the form of the consecration of the blood?

α. Opinion of Others and its Rejection

83. One assertion [Alexander of Hales, Aquinas] is that they do.

First about the words “which is shed for you.”, because the relative pronoun involves what precedes and is part of a single whole speaking.

84. Likewise they say this much more about the words “of the New and eternal Testament,” because this is a sort of specification of what precedes, when it is said “chalice of my blood, of the New and eternal....”

85. Now all these words, which seem to belong to a single speech, seem to belong to a single form; therefore both the words “of the New and.,” which it is certain belong to a single speech, and the words “which is shed for you.,” which, because of what they imply, seem to belong to the same speech, all belong to the form of the consecration of the blood.

86. But these arguments are not probative:

For it is possible that many things are added in the words of consecration and that the whole consecration would be obtained even if these many things were not expressed (just as Christ could have said, “This is my body, assumed from a Virgin and hung upon the cross,” as he said of the blood “which is shed for you.”); and then although the words would, by reason of devotion, need to be said, yet they would not have been strictly necessary for the form, even if they belonged to the same speech.

87. Also the words “which is shed for you” seem to be much less the same assertion as the preceding than do the words “of the New and eternal.”, because the words could be understood in the sense of composition and division (just as the sophism ‘every man who is other than Socrates is running’ is distinguished) - even if the implication, in the sense of composition, is part of the same assertion. And thus could it be understood in the matter at hand, so that before the ‘which is shed for you’ the complete statement would not be understood, or that by the ‘which is shed for you’ a statement added on jointly to the preceding in the sense of division would begin, and the ‘which’ would, following Priscian [Grammatical Instruction XVII 4 nn.27-32], be expounded by ‘and it’.‘Every man who is other than Socrates is running’ can be understood, in the sense of composition, to mean that among the men Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, all are running save the man Socrates; or it could be understood, in the sense of division, to mean that all men are other than Socrates, so that Socrates is not a man. In the context of the canon of the mass the words ‘which is shed for you’, if taken in the sense of composition would mean ‘my blood, that is, the blood which is shed for you’. In the sense of division, it would mean, ‘my blood, and it is shed for you’. ¹

88. Likewise too the words “of the New Testament” are commonly understood, in accord with the saints, as a confirmation of the remark in which what is implied by “chalice of my blood” is understood - “chalice of my blood, I say, which blood confirms the New and eternal Testament etc.”

β. Scotus’ own Opinion

89. About this article I say in brief that it has not altogether been handed down to us with certitude whether the words after ‘of my blood’ belong to the form of the consecration of the blood or to some of the other words that continue up to “Do this etc.” So it is dangerous to be assertive of that about which there is no sufficient authority. But it is not dangerous to be ignorant, for the ignorance seems invincible.

90. Herefrom follows a disproof of something said by a less discrete doctor [Richard of Middleton], that it is necessary in the case of any sacrament to know precisely what are the words belonging to the form in order for anyone to confer the sacrament. For this is manifestly false, not only in the issue at hand, but also in baptism and in penance and in the sacrament of Orders. For perhaps there is no one who knows for certain - neither a bishop nor an ordained minister - what words belong precisely to ordination to the priesthood, and yet one must not say that no one in the Church has been ordained to the priesthood.

91. What then is my advice?

I say that when a priest intends to do what the Church does and reads distinctly the words of the canon from beginning to end, he does truly perform the sacrament; nor is it safe for anyone, who reckons himself especially skilled, to rely on his knowledge and say “I wish to use the precise words for the consecration of the blood;” but simplicity is more secure, “I wish to speak the words with the intention with which Christ instituted that they be spoken, so that what by Christ’s institution belongs to the form I say as belonging to the form, and what by his institution belongs to reverence, I say for reverence.”

92. But what if the priest happens to hesitate before all the words are spoken; is the blood to be held truly consecrated?

I say here what was said in a case set down above [n.66], which is that if a priest begins to speak as follows, “this is my body” and does not state all the aforesaid words in their totality, I say that in all such cases the sacrament is not to be adored save under the condition ‘if it is truly consecrated’.

93. Are the words to be repeated then?

I say not absolutely.

94. But surely under a condition?

I say that there is not here the same sort of necessity as in baptism, because in baptism, when there is doubt about the baptizing, there is doubt about salvation; and so it is necessary sometimes to give baptism under a condition. But if here, in either of the cases mentioned [n.92], there is probable doubt whether the consecration is complete, no danger of salvation threatens if no repetition is made, whether absolutely or under a condition.

95. What then? Is the matter to be always or perpetually preserved?

I say no, because it would putrefy; but, after the communion during mass, the priest can receive the matter under some such conditional intention: “if this is consecrated I receive it as consecrated; if not, not, but I receive it as something about which there is uncertainty.” Nor can there be danger here, because he is fasting before receiving the cleansing wine. And if it is not blood that he receives, he yet does no irreverence to the body and blood already received, because we too after receiving the blood at once perceive pure [unconsecrated] wine [left] on the altar.

C. What the Form of the Eucharist Signifies

1. The Opinion of Peter of Poitiers and its Rejection

96. About the third point [n.59] the assertion is made [Peter of Poitiers] that “the priest speaks the words quasi-materially,” because “he recites them as they were said by Christ, as is plain from the text that precedes it in the canon.” But when Christ said those words he did not transubstantiate the bread into his body by them, because from the words of the canon it seems that “he made a blessing” is there as a preface. Hence it is asserted that he completed the consecration through the preceding benediction, and not through the following words ‘this is my body’.

97. Innocent III agrees with this On the Holy Mystery of the Altar IV chs.6, 17.

98. On the contrary:

Either Christ performed the sacrament without words, which is not likely, or with words, and then either with these words or with others. Not with others than those aforesaid, because it is not probable that the author and the ministers (to whom he committed the form) used different forms. If he used the same words the difficulty remains about the signification of the utterance Christ spoke last, “This is my body etc.” 99. Again, if Christ were now a wayfarer he could pronounce the words and perform the sacrament, and the difficulty remains as before.

2. The Opinion of Richard of Middleton and its Rejection

100. There is another opinion [Richard of Middleton], that a noun signifies without time and so can stand for a supposit of any time; and it cannot be restricted by the time co-signified by the verb that signifies the completed proposition. For the verb is remote from the understanding of the noun, and nothing is contracted by something that is remote from it (just as ‘man’ is not contracted when ‘man is white’ is said, though it is contracted when ‘this white man runs’ is said). So in like manner, when a pronoun is put in place of a proper name and signifies without time, it can signify or point to something without time, because ‘this’ signifies that it points to something for all time. And so the pronoun ‘this’ can, under a disjunction, point to what is contained under the species now or to what will be contained under them in a moment; so that, for the intellect, there is a pointing to what is directly pointed to and, for the senses, a pointing to what is indirectly pointed to [cf. IV d.2 n.19]; and what is directly pointed to is either something now present or something that will be present in the next moment, and what is pointed to for the senses is ‘under these species’. And the above disjunctive is true, because one or other part is true. And this as concerns the intellect, to which namely the divine virtue assents, when such words [sc. ‘this is my body’] are said, bringing about, at the final moment, what is signified.

101. Against this: although the pronoun ‘this’ need not point to anything for a determinate time, yet as he [Richard] himself argues, the signification of an utterance is constituted from the signification of the parts; but the parts signify when they are uttered; therefore, even according to him one must say that the word ‘this’, when uttered, signifies that which it then points to. But it does not seem that it can then point to something that is not then contained under the species, because one could in this way say ‘this fire is water’ or ‘this body is water’, when speaking of fire that is at once to be converted into water; and one could do such pointing for the senses indirectly and for the intellect directly, and do so by pointing to the body that is now or will be in the next moment. But it does not seem reasonable to say of air, when immediately changing it, that ‘this body is fire’; for the statement ‘this body is air’ is simply true, and ‘fire’ and ‘air’ are not said of the same thing at the same time.

102. Again, if the parts of an utterance signify when they are uttered, and if from the things signified by the parts thus taken the thing is signified by the whole utterance according to how that utterance takes the parts, then one must say that the ‘is’, when uttered, posits what it signifies for the present moment that it signifiess; but the subject of the first part of the disjunction [n.100] is not taken for any time that is the same as that which is imported by the copula ‘is’ [sc. ‘this’ is taken for the bread now, and ‘is my body’ is taken for the body in the next moment]. Therefore, the whole signification of the utterance does not refer to any same thing or to the same instant.

103. Again, a disjunctive does not posit either disjunct determinately, but a fallacy of the consequent follows; so if ‘this’ stands here disjunctively [sc. either for bread or for Christ’s body], it does not, in respect to the predicate, posit one disjunct (namely what will be under the species in the next moment), just as it does not posit the other disjunct either (namely what is now under the species). And what is brought about by the utterance is, according to them [Richard and his followers, n.100], only that the disjunction is true. Therefore, the effect of the disjunction is no more that what will immediately be under the species is the body of Christ than that what is now under them is so.

3. A Possible Solution Consisting of Thirteen Main Conclusions

104. [First conclusion] - Therefore one can say differently, and let this conclusion be the first, that the conception that is caused by the spoken utterance is only grasped in the last moment of the uttering of the words.

105. The proof is that a conception of all the parts of the utterance cannot be had before that point; for a conception of the whole utterance is not had without the conception of the parts.

106. There is confirmation by way of likeness, because a concept formed by an expression is not had before the final moment of uttering the expression; therefore similarly about uttering a complete sentence. And the reason for the likeness is that, just as the parts of an expression do not signify the simple concept that the expression signifies, so the expression does not signify any complex concept that the whole uttered sentence signifies. But the difference is that a part of a sentence does signify some concept, but a part of an expression does not signify any simple concept. However, the only difference relevant there to the matter at issue is that, in both cases, the whole conception is not had save at the end of everything uttered [n.105].

107. If objection is made that therefore an utterance causes a concept when it does not exist because, when it has been completely uttered, nothing of it exists - I reply: it is plain that the objection is not cogent, because the same could be argued about the concept imported by an expression.

108. Therefore I say that when a concept comes to be in the intellect in the moment after the utterance of a sentence or expression, it does not come to be through the uttering, because the uttering does not exist, as was said, but it comes to be at the end of the uttering of any expression through something caused in imagination by the expression, because of which (while it was being uttered) the intellect causes in itself some concept of the expression. Or more to the matter at hand, through things left behind by the individual expressions while they were being uttered, the intellect in the final moment brings them together and causes an understanding or conception of the whole. And therefore did I speak of the concept that is caused by the utterance [n.104], because otherwise it could be from the signified concept that is not caused by the utterance (as a concept in the speaker which he intends to express by his utterance).

109. And if it is argued against this conclusion that the thing signified by the whole utterance arises from the things signified by the parts and that the parts signify when they are uttered - I reply that the signification is not the formal reason of causing the concept in the hearer but is a certain preceding disposition, upon which there follows, by the intellect’s act of combining, a causing of the whole concept out of the concepts caused by the parts [n.108].

110. [Second conclusion] - The second conclusion is that it is not necessary that, in the moment of uttering or in time, the concept is caused in the hearer by the uttered words and that the truth of this concept is understood without uniting the terms. For if I say, ‘God created the world’, the concept of this assertion is caused in the final moment [sc. of the uttering], but the truth of it, or the uniting of the terms, is understood to be for the first moment of time [sc. for God created the world ‘in the beginning’]. So it is not the same to say ‘in which moment’ and ‘for which moment’ the whole statement is conceived; for it is conceived in the last moment of the completed assertion, and it is also conceived for the moment when the terms are indicated as being united in the intellect or outside in the thing [sc. ‘God created the world’ is understood in the final moment of the uttering of the assertion, but it is understood to be for, or about, the beginning of all time].

111. [Third conclusion] - The third conclusion is that the terms are denoted as being united for that moment, and consequently that there is truth in the assertion which is co-signified by the verb that joins the terms together; for there is nothing else in the proposition that would signify the time to which the union of the terms (from the understanding of the proposition) is referred.

112. [Fourth conclusion] - The fourth conclusion is that a verb of any time can signify a time or a moment; otherwise one could not express a concept about the present, past, or future union of the terms.

113. For if one could not co-signify a past moment when the verb is in the past tense, or a present one when it is in the present tense, or a future one when it is in the future tense, no proposition in which is expressed a union of terms would be true, and this union of terms could only be in a moment (for example, ‘this soul was created’ would not be true, nor ‘this soul is being created’ nor ‘this soul will be created’).

114. Also, if the present time could not be co-signified if the verb is present, nor past time if the verb is past nor future time if the verb is future, no proposition would be true whose terms cannot be united except for a time (and then ‘the heaven was in motion’ would not be true, nor ‘the heaven is in motion’ nor ‘the heaven will be in motion’).

115. In continuation of this conclusion I say that the statement ‘a verb cosignifies a moment or time properly speaking’ (whether speaking of a present or past or future verb) belongs to the multiplicity of the third mode of equivocation, which is according to things co-signified by an expression that has the same meaning [Peter of Spain, Tractatus tr.7 nn.29-39, 28]. But the unitings of the terms for a moment or a time are not causes of the truth of such a proposition, because there is no single mode that is included indifferently in the two modes. And so they would have to have one common concept when they are causes of truth in what they co-signify or signify.

116. [Fifth conclusion] - The fifth conclusion, according to one of the modes of speaking, is that a verb, if it is present tense and signifies a moment, signifies the moment of the complete uttering of the whole assertion, because the union and concept of the terms or of the whole assertion is understood for the whole time of the uttering, and the whole concept is understood for the final moment. But if the verb is present tense and cosignifies time, it co-signifies the time of its uttering, whether the whole of it or a part; and accordingly, if in the final moment of the uttering of a verb fire were generated, this proposition would be true ‘fire is generated’. Now this is similar to ‘the heaven is in motion’ or ‘I am running’, if in the whole time of the uttering of it or in any part, at least a large part, the terms are united. And accordingly these propositions will never be true ‘I am drinking’ or ‘I am sleeping’ and the like, because they cannot be true as they cosignify the moment, because the act cannot be in a moment - not even if it co-signifies time, because the terms are not united for the whole time of the uttering of the assertion nor for a part of it.

117. Therefore the proposition will always be false.

118. [Sixth conclusion] - Accordingly a sixth conclusion would be posited, that in a proposition about the present, when the verb co-signifies the present moment, the things signified by all the parts of the assertion must be understood for the final moment.

This conclusion is proved from the preceding one, because according to the Philosopher On Interpretation 2.16a13-18 “‘is’ signifies a certain composition” which one cannot understand without the things composed. Therefore if the copula ‘is’ had joined them for the final moment, then for that moment must the things signified by all the parts be understood.

120. [Seventh conclusion] - And herefrom there is a seventh conclusion for the present purpose, that when here the verb [sc. ‘is’] signifies not time but a moment, because the first union of the terms is done by infinite virtue and consequently in a moment, it follows that all the parts of the assertion and the things they signify must be understood for the final moment.

121. [Eighth conclusion] - From this follows an eighth conclusion, that the pronoun ‘this’ will hold for the moment of the complete utterance; and then it would be said to be demonstrative of that which for that moment is under the species, so that in this way the demonstrating is partly for the senses and partly for the intellect, and to this extent it is altogether simply so, as the first opinion said [n.100]. But that which is demonstrated for the intellect and directly is not demonstrated disjunctively, but what is now contained [under the species] is demonstrated etc.

122. [Ninth conclusion] - The ninth conclusion is that in the case of singulars the order follows the order of universals. For any universal can be understood to descend to its proper singular before it is contracted through some difference to some lower level of predication, as to the species, and so we have the following order of singulars: ‘this being’ ‘this substance’ ‘this body’ and so successively to ‘Socrates’.

123. This is plain from Avicenna in his Physics, Sufficientia 1.1, because from a distance we first see a body before we see an animal, and an animal before we see a man [cf. Ord. I d.3 n.84], which is not to be understood of universals (for sight does not see universals), but of singulars of something more universal.That is, we do not see the universal ‘body’ before we see the individual Socrates, but we see this body, this animal, this man, Socrates. ²

124. [Tenth conclusion] - And then there is a tenth conclusion, that ‘this’ in a proposition points to a singular being and not per se to a singular of some class more or less universal than being.

125. The proof:

First, because one reasonably asks about many things ‘what is this?’, but the supposit and that which is asked about are not the same thing; therefore if the ‘this’ stands for ‘this wood’ or ‘this stone’, because that is what is being asked about, it follows that the same thing that supposits is being asked about; for when the response is given, namely ‘wood’ or ‘stone’, the mind of the asker is brought to rest about that singular. So what supposits here for the singular is only that it is a singular being, and the question asked is about something specific under being, and anything specific under being is appropriate as a response. And this proof rests on a single word that is put in Exodus 16.15 about manna, that is, ‘what is this?’

126. Another proof is a sort of grammatical one, that an adjective, when in a substantive of neuter gender, includes the substantive in itself according to the grammarians; but it only includes that which is something or a being;     therefore etc     .

127. [Eleventh conclusion] - The eleventh conclusion, that although the ‘this’ here only per se stands for a singular being, yet it is understood for a singular of some lower predication and regularly for the singular that is ‘the body of Christ’; because the singular is only there in that which is the body of Christ, and only in the last moment for which being in some singular thing is demonstrative.

128. [Twelfth conclusion] - The twelfth conclusion is that not for this reason will the sense of the proposition be ‘my body is my body’, because the understanding of the antecedent [‘this’] is one thing and the understanding of the consequent [‘my body’] another, even though the subject of the consequent is standing for the subject of the antecedent.

129. The fact is plain because the concept of the consequent can be certain and of the antecedent doubtful; and to be certain and doubtful are not the same.

130. It is also plain by converting the proposition, because the sense of ‘my body is this’, that is, ‘.. .is this being’ is different from the proposition ‘my body is my body’.

131. [Thirteenth conclusion] - The thirteenth conclusion is that, according to this understanding, the proposition [‘this is my body’] can effect or convert [sc. the bread]. For the minister who is principally bringing it about that, in the moment for which he enunciates the proposition, this assertion then signifies, would himself principally convert it, for ‘to bring principally about that this being is the body of Christ’ is really to bring about a conversion through which the body of Christ receives ‘being this’ (for the bringing about by which this being becomes the body of Christ and by which the body of Christ becomes this being, that is, becomes this being which is under these species, is the same bringing about). But the assertion which acts by way of signifying must be conversive [of the bread] for the moment for which the one converting really acts. Therefore this assertion is effective simply.

4. Weighing of the Aforesaid Conclusions

132. From these thirteen conclusions it is plain how this assertion [‘this is my body’] is true because, according to the conclusions, the whole understanding of it, both of the proposition and of the terms, is taken for the final moment of the utterance; and for that moment it points to the same thing that then exists under the accidents. Now it is true that this is the body of Christ and that the proposition does not, on account of ‘this’, get converted into ‘my body is my body’. But the proposition ‘this is my body’ can be a converting proposition, though the other is not, because it denotes a singular of a more universal kind, namely this being that is predicated, but the other denotes that it is specifically said of itself. But a proposition which denotes that some primary predicate is said of ‘this being’ can be effective, just as can the proposition that would denote of a stone that it is first ‘this being’.

133. All these conclusions I can concede, apart from the fifth (and the others insofar as they follow from it), for the verb, when uttered, co-signifies then just as it signifies then; and unless some determination is added whereby the co-signified time would be referred to a different present moment, it does not seem from the force of the utterance that it would join the terms for any moment save for the final moment of uttering the present tense verb.

134. Nor is the proof that is put there [n.116] compelling; for although the understanding of the whole utterance is only brought about by the utterance in the final moment, as was expounded in the first conclusion [nn.104-106], yet a conception of the union of the terms only comes to be for that moment, as is plain from the second conclusion.

135. This is also plain in the case of propositions about the past and future, where a verb can unite a proposition for any past or future moment, however distant from the speaker. And yet the understanding there of the whole assertion is not got save in the moment of the completed utterance, just as neither is the understanding of a proposition about the present so got, nor universally the understanding of any proposition.

136. Through this too can be destroyed what follows on the fifth conclusion, about the demonstrative force of the pronoun ‘this’, for if it must be understood for the time or moment for which there is a combining of terms, and if the combining of terms is not understood for the final moment of the whole utterance but for the moment of the utterance of the verb ‘is’, then it follows that the demonstrative force is understood for the same thing.

137. There is also another difficulty against the aforesaid, specifically about demonstrative force [n.121]; for a demonstrative pronoun, when uttered, signifies what it is demonstrative of; therefore it signifies what can then be pointed to. But there is nothing then able to be pointed to there for the senses save the accidents, nor pointed to for the intellect, as it seems, save what is under the accidents.

One can therefore say a little differently that one does not get from the force of the speaking that the concept of a proposition about the past, or the union of the terms, is understood precisely for the final moment of the whole assertion; but if it is understood to be for a moment it should be understood for the moment of the complete utterance of the verb. The parts too signify when uttered, and if the nature of their signification is such as only to be extended to something that is present when the parts signify, then it is necessary that what they signify is present when the parts are uttered.

138. However it is very possible for someone to determine himself to express some propositional concept for a moment, and possible for the concepts of all the parts of that concept to be taken for that same final moment of utterance; for it is in this way that disputants determine themselves to state their meaning in their responses and to do so for the same moment; otherwise the respondent could never be refuted however much he might accept contradictories. And if indeed he wished to express his concept to another by an assertion about the present, he will not cause a concept in that other for the final moment of utterance by virtue of his words; but it is possible that he express to him for some reason what for that moment he is uttering. And then for such reason, not by virtue of his words, he will conceive the union of the terms for that moment. But if he himself, when speaking, were to intend to cause something by his proposition, then just as he could also intend to express a concept for the final moment, so he could intend to cause the effect for that moment. If too, on the uttering of the assertion, which intends some concept and all its parts to be taken for some moment, someone else, seeing the intention, wanted to cause something, he could cause it for the final moment for which he intends to signify all those things

139. And in this way, although what was said before in the fifth conclusion and the following ones about the final moment of utterance [nn.116, 118-121, 127, 132] is not manifest by virtue of the words, yet it is manifest that they can be understood as far as concerns the intention of him who expresses them, both in himself and as he is a minister of God who, seeing the minister’s intention, can assist with the assertion so as to act in the same way as the assertion itself signifies according to the intention of the speaker of it.

140. Whether this way is held to, that by virtue of the words the whole assertion must be referred to the final moment of the words or the utterance [n.139], or this other, that it is not by virtue of the words but by the determination of the utterer (and this not only in himself but in his ordering to the principal agent who assists the action [nn.138-139]), and if there is preserved in the one way or the other the fact that the proposition is true according to the eighth conclusion and the others that follow it, with which I do not disagree - yet there remains the difficulty common to both ways as to how the proposition [‘this is my body’] is true. For according to both ways, although the proposition is true for the final moment, yet not naturally before the conversion is complete; because the thing naturally ought to be before the assertion is true, “for by the fact the thing is or is not, the assertion is true or false,” Categories 5.4b9-10. The truth, then, does not naturally precede the conversion but follows it; and, as a result, the proposition, as it is true, is not such as to do the converting.

5. Scotus’ own Conclusion

141. For this reason I say that this whole disputation (in thirteen conclusions and their proofs and disproofs) about saving the truth of this proposition [‘this is my body’] is subtle and matter for logic. But for a theologian it suffices that the assertion, as it is a sensible sign, is an instrument of God, instituted by God, for the consecration that follows in the final instant, such that God assists in it as it is a certain preceding effective disposition, so that, when it is complete, he may cause the relevant invisible effect. But the assertion’s truth, as it is such a disposition, does not precede the action of God, because, being a perceptible sign in a state of becoming and consequently in time, it is not understood to have its own truth. Also, when it does have truth, its truth follows, in the order of nature, the divine action.

142. Briefly, then, the theologian should say that, however a logician might save the truth of the proposition, yet the proposition is not a sacramental pronouncement as it is true, but as it is the sort of perceptible sign it is, preceding its truth perhaps in time -and at least naturally - , just as a disposition continuous in time precedes the final moment and the condition in the final moment of whatever it precedes; a cause too precedes the condition of the caused.

143. And if you ask ‘what sort of proposition, either as true or false, is this proposition that converts [the bread]?’, I say that it is neither one way nor the other but only as it is a neutral proposition and prior naturally (and perhaps in time) to its truth.

144. And this priority is proved as follows, that any foundation is prior to the accident that is a relation; a proposition or concept is a foundation in respect of truth, which is an accident that is a relation, because truth can be in or not in a proposition, just as a proposition can conform or not conform with the thing. For when Socrates is sitting the assertion that says ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true, as is said in Categories 5.4a10-b18. Therefore the concept of an assertion as it is in itself is naturally prior to its truth - and the assertion itself too, as it is variable and in a state of becoming, is still prior in duration to its concept (just as time is prior to its ending final moment).

145. And this fact too about the natural priority of the concept to the truth is manifestly plain in a learner; for first a student conceives the undemonstrated conclusion, and indeed as then neither true nor false, and yet he perceives and conceives the whole per se concept of it; second, when a demonstration is applied to it, he conceives it as true. And it is plainly evident that God could institute some un-meaning sentence upon whose utterance by a minister he would assist at the end of the uttering in causing an effect.

146. So, therefore, however it may be with the logical disputation about how the proposition [‘this is my body’] is true [n.141], this point is to be held as certain, that the proposition, as a vocal sign and in external coming to be, is an efficacious sign in respect of consecration, because it is a preceding disposition that God, by compact, assists with at the end in effective causing of an effect [cf. IV d.1 nn.308, 315, 325, d.4 n.103] -regardless of whether the proposition signifies this sort of effect (which is true and fitting in the matter at hand), and that merely so, namely as neither true nor false but insofar as it is a disposition; or whether it signifies the effect as a true proposition does, and that for the time when it is a disposition or for the moment for which what it is a disposition for will be caused, and then as naturally prior or as naturally posterior to the moment in which the effect will be caused.

147. But one could in a different way make a subtle distinction here, that in the final moment of utterance there is first, according to the order of nature, a concept of the proposition as neither [sc. true or false]; that second a divine operation follows on it, causing what the assertion designates; that third the truth of this conception follows. And so not only is the assertion prior to truth as it is vocally and continuously uttered, but also as it has its proper effect, though not as something true.

148. However this subtlety implies things that belong to the logical disputation about the truth of the proposition or of the conception of the proposition, namely that it is true for the final moment [n.140]; and the subtlety does nothing for the assertion as it is something sacramental. For the conception that is posited as being got through the assertion in the final moment [n.116] is in no way an instrument of God for the action of God that is posited as following in the second moment of nature [n.147], because God does not use for his operation anything sacramental save the perceptible sign [IV d.1 n.315].

149. So in brief, therefore, it suffices for the minister, without his engaging then in dispute about what the assertion is understood for, to intend to pronounce the words in the way that Christ instituted that they be pronounced. And in this way the due intention and the due instrument are got, namely the spoken assertion itself, which instrument, applied by such agent [sc. the minister], God assists so as to cause such effect in the final moment.

150. From these points the understanding of the form of consecration over the wine is plain, because the logical disputation and theological certitude [sc. about the wine] could be altogether like [sc. the disputation and certitude about the bread].

151. But that the words ‘this chalice’ are here set down is because the blood is consecrated under the idea of drink; and a liquid does not have the idea of drink save in a vessel. But nothing of the sort is set down in the idea and consecration of the body, because the body is confected as food, and a solid has the idea of food even though it is not in a vessel.

II. To the Initial Arguments

152. As to the first argument [n.53], it is plain that the ‘this’ is a singular demonstrative of being, and not the bread or its accidents; for it is demonstrative for the moment of the complete uttering of the assertion, and that either by virtue of the words, according to the fifth and seventh conclusions [nn.116, 120], or by the intention of the speaker, according to another way [nn.139-140]. Nor is this the same as saying ‘my body is my body’, as is plain from the thirteenth conclusion [n.131]. And the fact is plain because the proposition ‘this is fire’ could be such as to convert, but not the proposition ‘fire is fire’, because what ‘this being is fire’ does is to make a certain conversion, but not so ‘fire is fire’.

153. As to the second [n.54], it is plain that the ‘for’ is put there to produce continuity in the words, so that the individual words could not there be uttered at once as distinct.

154. As to the third [n.55], I concede that it ought to be that the ‘my’, by virtue of the words, be denoted as referring to the person of Christ; but this is not the case unless mention is made first of Christ, in whose person the words are uttered; just as, if I were to say “Christ said, ‘my doctrine is not mine’,” the signification, from the truth of the proposition, would be that the ‘mine’ is referred to Christ; but not so if, without speaking previously about Christ, someone were at once to say, ‘my doctrine is not mine’.

155. As to the two arguments against the consecration of the blood [nn.56-57], the answer is plain in the body of the question [nn.72-95].

Question Three. Whether the Sacrament of the Eucharist was fittingly Instituted after the Cena, or whether it could be Received by those not Fasting

156. The third questiona is whether this sacrament could be celebrated or received by those not fasting.

a.a [Interpolation]: Proceeding thus to the third question, I ask, since the Eucharist was given to the disciples after the Cena, whether...

157. It seems that it could be:

Because Christ gave the Eucharist after the Cena to his disciples when they had eaten.

158. Again in I Corinthians 11.34 it is said, “if anyone is hungry, let him eat at home,” where the Apostle is giving approval that, before the Corinthians come together to church, they should satisfy their hunger at home, so that they not take of the species immoderately in church. Hence he rebukes them in the same place [11.21] saying, “One is hungry and another drunk.”

159. On the contrary.

Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.24, from Augustine To the Questions of Januarius 1.6, “It has pleased the Holy Spirit that, in honor of so great a sacrament, the body of the Lord should enter the mouth of a Christian before other food does; therefore is this custom observed everywhere.”

I. To the Question

A. About the Four Ways of Receiving this Sacrament

160. I reply that one can receive this sacrament and not receive it sacramentally; one can receive the sacrament and receive it sacramentally but not spiritually; one can receive the sacrament sacramentally and spiritually.

161. He receives in the first way who receives the consecrated host, which is truly the sacrament there but, however, does not receive it as consecrated but altogether does not discriminate it from common food. And such a one, according to the Apostle in I Corinthians 11.29, “eats and drinks judgment to himself, not discerning the body of the Lord,” that is, not discriminating it from common food. And this can be done either from lack of faith (as a pagan, if communion were given to him) or, when there is faith as well, from contempt (as in the case of a bad Christian).

162. He receives it in the second way who not only receives the sacrament but receives it as a sacrament, believing that the body of Christ is there and that he is receiving the communion of the body of Christ in the way such communion is accustomed to be done in the Church. But if he is in mortal sin, lacking contrition, he does not receive it spiritually, because he does not receive the spiritual effect (to which this sort of spiritual reception is ordered), and this effect is spiritual nourishment of the soul through the grace given by Christ received in the sacrament, or it is incorporation in the received Christ himself, as Christ said, according to Augustine Confessions 7.10.16, “I am the food of the mature.”

163. In the third way the good among the faithful receive it, being, as far as they can, without mortal sin. For they have examined their conscience carefully, and such are spiritually nourished and united and incorporated in Christ their spiritual food, according to Augustine [ibid.], “Grow and you will eat me, not converting me into you, but you will be converted into me.” For there is this difference between bodily and spiritual nutrition, that bodily nutrition is converted into him who needs nourishing, while he who is fed on spiritual nourishment is converted into the food.

164. It is plain, then, that he receives in all these three ways who receives it as a sacrament, and as containing the body of Christ, and does so with due reverence and devotion, so that he is nourished spiritually, the way sacramental reception signifies.

165. In a fourth way the sacrament is received spiritually but not sacramentally, namely when a good man is prepared well and devoutly according to his ability, yet abstains out of reverence or some infirmity or perhaps because he cannot get a minister. With this agrees the remark of Augustine On John’s Gospel tr.25 n.12 [Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.47], “Why do you prepare your teeth and stomach? Believe, and you have eaten.” And such a one is nourished spiritually.

B. A Difficulty as to the Third Way and its Solution

166. As to the matter at hand I say that the sacrament can be received in the first two ways by those not fasting just as by those who are fasting (speaking not of ‘can’ licitly but absolutely). But about the third way, namely not about ‘can’ absolutely but licitly and usefully, the question poses a difficulty.

167. I distinguish between the fast of nature and the fast of the Church.

The fast of the Church is only broken by some extraordinary replenishment outside the custom of the Church; hence the fast of the Church is not broken because of the taking of health supplements or medicines or through drink, at least after a meal.

168. But the fast of nature is the lack of food taken or to be taken in the stomach, or at least taken on the way to the stomach so as to enter the stomach, and this on the day of fasting, counting from the beginning of the day when someone is said to be fasting.

169. Likewise I distinguish between ‘ought’ and ‘permitted’, because either it is being understood as a matter of rule or in some particular case.

170. I say therefore that as a matter of rule the receiver should, for spiritual and sacramental reception, be fasting simply, that is, with the fast of nature. Nor is there any main reason for this except divine institution, which either Christ gave to his disciples or promulgated through them or left to be instituted. And indeed the institution is reasonable because of reverence for the sacrament, which reverence is regularly lesser in someone who has eaten than in someone who is fasting - and also so that one may seek spiritual food before bodily food.

171. But if a particular case is being understood [n.169], I say that there can be a case in which someone not fasting is quasi regularly permitted to approach [the sacrament], as someone in a grave sickness when danger of imminent death is feared; for then it would be dangerous to deny the sacrament to an ill person who, although having eaten, is begging for the sacrament, because it is viaticum. And therefore it must be given to him who is departing from this world, so that he may thereby be led to the goal.

172. Another special case is as when in some region the sacrament is regularly celebrated using white wine, and an assistant prepares the chalice for the priest and, by some negligence, puts in water instead of wine; the priest however supposes the assistant has prepared the chalice well and proceeds to say the sacramental words and to do the other things up to when he receives, but on receiving the liquid from the chalice he realizes it is water. It seems that he could not on that day receive the blood, if the receiver should be fasting.

173. I say therefore that in that case the priest is bound to consecrate the blood again and to receive the consecrated element.

174. The proof is that when two precepts are in a certain order, the precept of higher order is more binding. One precept is that of Christ and the Church, and the sacrament, by the very idea of the sacrament, should, when it is confected, be confected and received integrally, because the sacrament in itself is something integrated from two things.

175. For the obligation of the Church is rigid about keeping this integrity, Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.12, “Either let them receive the whole integrated sacrament or refrain from the whole integrated sacrament,” and Gratian is speaking of priests who confect and afterwards do not communicate. And a reason is added: “because the division of the sacrament cannot arise without grave sacrilege.”

176. Therefore, when any other precept is set down by the Church, and especially one that does not have regard to the proper and essential idea of the sacrament, every celebrant is always bound to keep the integrity of the sacrament. Therefore, he who has received water is simply bound to complete what he has omitted, namely omitted for consecrating the sacrament. And then further, if he is bound to consecrate the wine, the same person is bound to receive what is consecrated. Hence is contained in Gratian Decretum ibid. ch.11, “It is certain that those who sacrifice and do not eat are guilty of the Lord’s sacrament;” and there follows, let him who is such “know that he is expelled from communion for a year; therefore it must be in every way maintained that, as often as a priest immolates the body and blood, he make himself a participant in receiving the body and blood.”

177. He is necessarily bound, then, by the institution of Christ and because of the integrity of the sacrament, to confect the blood and, by the strictest precept of the Church (under pain of being expelled for a year), bound to receive what is consecrated.

178. And if it be objected, ‘he is not fasting, so he sins mortally by confecting the sacrament; either then he should not confect so that he does not receive, or if he must confect and receive he must sin against the precept of the Church. And then he is in perplexity, which is not to be said about any of the precepts of God and the Church’ - I reply that the Church does not as strictly prescribe that a receiver be fasting (by prohibiting the non-faster from receiving) as it prohibits the division of the sacrament (rather the division is prohibited by Christ and from the first institution of the Eucharist). Nor does the Church as strictly prohibit the non-faster from receiving as it commands the consecrator to receiver. Therefore, on the one side he has the precept of Christ about thus consecrating, and, after the consecration, he has the most strict command of the Church about receiving. On the other side he has only a comparatively light command of the Church about fasting. For it is not set down that a non-fasting receiver is guilty of the Lord’s sacrament, or that there is sacrilege there, or that he is expelled from communion for a year, as it is in the former case. The Church then simply did not intend to bind one to fast in this case; to the contrary, because the other two precepts are, both by virtue of Christ and by virtue of the Church, stronger and more binding.

179. Nor is he then perplexed, because he does well by keeping the precept of superior order and the stricter precept of the Church; and if he does not keep it, he sins mortally. But by omitting the less strict precept he does not sin with a new sin, because in this case he is not bound to keep the precept, nor did the Church want to bind him to the precept in this case, but rather to the opposite.

180. It is also manifestly plain that fasting is not as necessary a condition in a priest who receives, because on the day of Preparation for the Passover a particle [sc. of the host] placed in the chalice is received with pure unconsecrated wine, because the chalice from some preceding day is not preserved. And it is likely that the wine descends more quickly into the stomach than the particle of the host that is chewed. Therefore, by the custom of the Church, the priest in this case receives the eucharist when not fasting, and it is likely that the wine more quickly reaches the belly than the particle of the host that is chewed does. Therefore, by the custom of the Church the priest there receives the Eucharist when not fasting.

181. And if it be objected that there will be scandal if the people perceive the priest confecting the blood for a second time - one response is that if they were scandalized the scandal is that of the Pharisees, namely taken and not given, for the deed in itself is good and necessary. And everyone should judge that the deed, if they do not know the cause of it, is good, and should suppose that the priest has a good cause. Everyone too should, if he know the cause, approve of it. Hence Christ, when contemning such scandal, says of it, Matthew 15.13-14 about the Pharisees, “Let them alone. They are blind and leaders of the blind; every plant that my Father has not planted etc.”

182. One can reply in another way that the priest can very well avoid the supposed scandal, if he acts with caution. For by going to the side of the altar, as if for receiving the wine after communion, and pouring in wine and water (whether the already remaining water, because he has not consumed all of it, or water freshly put in), he will be able to return to the middle of the altar, and in a little time from the place ‘In like manner, after having eaten, Christ took the chalice,’ he will be able to continue to the place ‘As often as you do this’ or to the place ‘Therefore.. .mindful...’; and, after uttering these words, he will be able, with due reverence, to receive it as true blood. Nor will all this be perceived [by others], because it can be done in a short time; and so he will not take up so much time that the people can have enough occasion for scandal taken.

183. And if against this is argued what was said about the integrity of the sacrament [nn.173-177], that the priest does not receive the blood on the day of Preparation, I reply: the integrity is required in the consecrating, namely that no one consecrate the body unless he also consecrate the blood. Now it is not required in any reception of the sacrament (for the laity can well receive the body and not the blood); but it is required in the reception that follows consecration (this is contained in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 n.11).

II. To the Initial Arguments

184. To the first argument for the opposite [n.157] Augustine well replies, To the Questions of Januarius 1.6, in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.24, “That the Lord gave the Eucharist to the disciples after a meal is not a reason that those should receive as they did who have eaten. They are rebuked by the Apostle (I Corinthians 11.20-22).” And Augustine adds the cause why the Savior did it then, “For the Savior,” he says, “in order to commend more forcefully the greatness of this mystery, wished to fix it last in the hearts of his disciples. But in what order it should be taken thereafter he left for the disciples to teach, through whom he was going to make disposition for the Churches.”

185. The same point serves for the second argument [n.158]: because according to Augustine [n.184] the Apostle rebuked those who took the Eucharist after eating. And therefore the words “if anyone is hungry, let him eat at home” should not be understood to mean he should eat at home before he comes to church but after departure from the church, so that he not sate his hunger on the Eucharist (the way he says “another is drunk”). Rather, waiting for what will be necessary for him at home he should receive what is his own. And for this reason is the custom of the Latin Church praiseworthy, which dispenses the Eucharist to no one save in small quantity (so that it cannot be taken to get drunk) and very well sufficient for due reverence of the sacrament.

186. From this is plain that a man can eat soon after communion, because the sacred species are soon converted - which seems must be conceded here [Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.23].

Final Note

187. The fourth point that the Master touches on in this distinction, because it is about the thing of the sacrament [n.11], more properly belongs to the treatment in distinction 10. Therefore, I omit it for the present, keeping it for later, namely for the aforesaid place [d.10].